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Abstract
This paper explores the consequences of introducing a monopolistic competition in a two-
sector open economy model. The effects of fiscal and technological shocks are simulated.
First, unlike the perfectly competitive framework, the present model is consistent with the
saving-investment correlations found in the data. Second, the degree of competition ob-
served in non traded markets matters in determining the current account and investment
responses to fiscal and technological shocks. Third, simulations show that the perfectly
competitive two-sector model is too restrictive when investigating the relationship between
the relative price of non traded goods and real factors like fiscal policies and productivity
disturbances.
Keywords: Monopolistic Competition; Inflation; Fiscal Policy; Productivity.
JEL Classification: E20; E62; F31; F41.
Re´sume´
Cet article de´veloppe un mode`le d’e´quilibre ge´ne´ral dynamique a` deux secteurs avec con-
currence monopolistique sur le marche´ des biens non e´changeables. Les effets des chocs
de de´penses publiques et de productivite´ sont simule´s nume´riquement. Conforme´ment aux
re´sultats empiriques, le mode`le ge´ne`re des corre´lations positives entre e´pargne et investisse-
ment. En outre, le degre´ d’intensite´ concurrentielle sur le marche´ des biens non e´changeables
affecte les re´actions du solde courant et de l’investissement apre`s un choc de demande ou
d’offre. Enfin, les re´sultats nume´riques montrent que le mode`le a` deux secteurs en concur-
rence parfaite fournit un cadre the´orique trop restrictif pour e´tudier le comportement du
prix relatif des biens non e´changeables.
Mots-cle´s : Concurrence Imparfaite; Inflation; De´penses Publiques; Productivite´.
Classification JEL : E20; E62; F31; F41.
1Romain RESTOUT, EconomiX, University Paris-X Nanterre and Gate, Ecole Normale Supe´rieure LSH
(romain.restout@ens-lsh.fr). The author is grateful to Olivier Cardi, Vale´rie Mignon and Alain Sand for significant
comments. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the VIIIth RIEF Doctoral Meeting, the XIIIth
SMYE, the 63rd ESEM and the LVIIth AFSE, and has benefited from comments of participants. The usual
disclaimers apply.
1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed the relevance of the imperfect competition as a promising framework
for the analysis of disturbances in international macroeconomic models. Sen [2005] explores
welfare effects of a tariff in a two-sector model and shows that, relaxing the perfect competition
assumption in the traded (non traded) sector leads protection policy to be welfare-improving
(-reducing). Heijdra and Ligthart [2006] and Coto-Martinez and Dixon [2003] demonstrate that
the fiscal multiplier is increasing with the degree of imperfection competition. Ubide [1999] finds
that the introduction of imperfect competition improves the performance of the real business
cycle model to match empirical regularities.
This paper extends the two-sector continuous time model of Turnovsky and Sen [1995] by
introducing monopolistic competition in the non traded goods sector.1 More specially, the
market structure in that sector includes Dixit and Stiglitz [1977] preferences and endogenous
markups which depend on the composition of aggregate demand for non traded goods. The
starting point for this paper is the growing evidence that (i) goods markets appear to be less
competitive than is commonly supposed, and (ii) foreign competition lowers the distortions
from imperfect competition by reducing markups. Christopoulou and Vermeulen [2008] provide
markup estimates for manufacturing and services industries for a group of eight Euro area
countries. Their estimates report that markups for services tend to be higher than those observed
in manufacturing industries, averaging 1.56 and 1.18 respectively.2
The model is calibrated with standard parameters values to match OECD data and is poten-
tially useful in explaining empirical regularities. First off, the introduction of a monopolistic non
traded sector in a small open economy facing perfect capital mobility seems to provide a convinc-
ing explanation to resolve the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle (Feldstein and Horioka [1980]). Indeed,
by introducing some form of imperfect competition, the model outperforms the Walrasian two-
sector framework in replicating the saving-investment correlations of the OECD data, without
relaxing the assumption that financial assets are perfectly mobile internationally. Second, sim-
ulations show that the monopolistically two-sector model offers a richer framework to analyze
the effects fiscal and technological shocks on the relative price of non traded goods. Indeed, the
paper emphasizes the importance of the endogenous response of the markup in transmitting de-
mand and supply disturbances to the relative price. Unlike the competitive model, the relative
price of non traded goods responds to fiscal shocks in the long-run. Furthermore, numerical
results indicate that a part of the relative price appreciation triggered by productivity growth
differentials can be attributed to the endogenous variations in markups. This result puts into
perspective the basic prediction of the usual perfectly competitive Balassa-Samuelson model
(Balassa [1964] and Samuelson [1964]) that the relative price is entirely supply-side. Third,
the responses of the current account and investment to fiscal and technological shocks may be
1Coto-Martinez and Dixon [2003] include the monopolistic competition hypothesis in the Turnovsky and Sen’s
[1995] model as well. However, their framework and purpose depart from ours in two points. First, the underlying
assumptions are quite different. Unlike the present model, Coto-Martinez and Dixon introduce sunk costs in the
non traded market and a labor-leisure trade-off. Second, most of Coto-Martinez and Dixon’s attention is devoted
to effects of fiscal policy with the purpose to draw out the differences between free entry and fixed number of
firms situations. In contrast, this framework analyzes the model’s responses to both supply and fiscal shocks.
2Moreover, markups differ across countries. Estimates for services (manufacturing) ranges from 1.26 (1.13)
for France (Netherlands) to 1.87 (1.23) in Italy (Italy).
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reversed in the monopolistically competitive model compared to those derived in the perfectly
competitive framework. In particular, results are quite dependent from the degree of competi-
tion and indicate that it may be useful to depart from the assumption of perfect competition
when analyzing the effects of fiscal policies and productivity disturbances on the current account
and investment variables.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the monopolistically
competitive two-sector small open economy. Section 3 is devoted to numerical simulations and
studies the effects of fiscal and technological shocks. Conclusions are presented in Section 4.
2 The Framework
The small open economy produces two types of goods: one is non traded and, the other is traded
and serves as numeraire. The production of the traded good can be consumed domestically or
exported, while the non traded good may be domestically consumed or used for physical capital
investment.3 The traded sector is perfectly competitive with firms producing a homogenous
good. By contrast, the non traded sector is characterized by the presence of a continuum of
monopolistically competitive firms producing a specific good indexed by z ∈ [0, 1].
2.1 Households and Government
The representative household supplies inelastically his labor endowment, normalized to one for
analytical convenience, L = 1, and maximizes a lifetime utility function of the form∫
∞
0
u (c) e−βt dt, (1)
with
c = c
(
cT , cN
)
, and cN =
(∫ 1
0
cN (z)
ρ−1
ρ dz
) ρ
ρ−1
, (2)
where β is the consumer’s discount rate, β ∈ [0, 1], and u(.) is strictly concave. The composite
consumption good c is an aggregate of traded and non traded consumptions (cT and cN re-
spectively), while preferences over the non traded goods are described by the Dixit and Stiglitz
[1977] aggregator function, ρ being the substitution elasticity between the varieties (ρ > 1). The
household decision problem is solved by the means of three-stage budgeting.
In the first stage, the consumer chooses the time profile for aggregate consumption to max-
imize the utility function (1) subject to its following budget constraint:
a˙ = r∗a+Π+ w − picc− TL, (3)
where a is the real financial wealth, r∗ is the exogenous real world interest rate, Π is the
household’s profit income, w is the real wage rate, pic is the given consumption-based price
3Brock and Turnovsky [1994] develop a model that incorporates both types of capital goods (traded and non
traded), and demonstrate that dynamics of the core model depends only upon the relative intensities of the non
traded investment good. In addition, empirical researches point out that investments have a very significant
nontradable component. Burstein et al. [2004] estimate this share within the 0.46-0.71 range, averaging 0.59.
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index and TL denotes lump-sum taxes paid to the government.4 Letting λ be the shadow value
of wealth measured in terms of traded bonds, the first-order conditions associated with the
household’s optimal dynamic plans are
uc = pi
cλ, (4a)
λ˙ = λ (β − r∗) , (4b)
and the transversality condition lim
t→∞
λae−βt = 0. The optimality condition (4a) equates
the marginal utility of consumption to the shadow value of wealth measured in terms of the
consumption-price index. With a constant rate of time preference and an exogenous interest
rate, from equation (4b) we impose β = r∗ in order to ensure the existence of a well-behaved
steady-state. This standard assumption implies that the marginal utility of wealth must remain
constant over time and is always at its steady state level, λ¯.
In the second stage, total expenditure on consumption is divided over traded and non traded
goods according to
cT = (1− α)picc, and pcN = αpicc, (5)
where α is the share of consumption expenditure spent on non traded goods (0 < α < 1), and
p is the relative price of the composite non traded good (see below). Combining (4a) and (5),
cT and cN may be solved as functions of λ¯ and p which gives the Frisch demand curves:
cT = cT
(
λ¯, p
)
, and cN = cN
(
λ¯, p
)
, (6)
with cT
λ¯
< 0, cTp ≶ 0, c
N
λ¯
< 0 and cNp < 0.
5 An higher shadow value of wealth induces domestic
households to increase savings and to reduce consumption of both goods. An increase in the
relative price of the non traded good leads to a decline in its consumption, while the sign of
cTp depends on the interplay between the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (σ) and the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution between traded and non traded goods (φ).
In the third stage, total non traded consumption is allocated between varieties as follows,
cN (z) =
(
p(z)
p
)
−ρ
cN , (7)
where p(z) is the relative price of the non traded good z and p stands for the non traded good
relative price index in the form p =
(∫ 1
0
p(z)1−ρdz
) 1
1−ρ
.
Finally, the domestic government levies lump-sum taxes TL to finance real expenditures gT
and gN (z) and follows a balanced budget policy given by:
gT +
∫ 1
0
p(z)gN (z)dz = TL. (8)
4In this setup subindexes denote the variable with respect to which the derivative is taken, while overdots
indicate time derivatives.
5Expressions of short-run solutions derived in the Section 2 are reported in Appendix A.
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2.2 Elasticity of Demand and Markup
The demand faced by non traded firm z, denoted by Y N (z), has two components: private
consumption, cN (z), and public spending, gN (z). The (absolute value of the) elasticity of
the demand curve for good z, noted η(z), is the weighted average of individual elasticities.
Government expenditure gN (z) being exogenous, η(z) simplifies to:
η(z) = ρ
cN (z)
Y N (z)
≡
µ(z)
µ(z)− 1
, (9)
where the (absolute value of the) price-elasticity of cN (z) is ρ and µ(z) represents the firm’s
markup. The second equality in (9) implicity defines the markup as functions of the degree of
substitutability of non traded goods, ρ, and the composition of the demand faced by producers
present in the domestic market. The higher is ρ, the better substitutes the varieties are for
each other and the closer is the model to the perfectly competitive one. Moreover, the markup
varies endogenously in response to exogenous shocks that affect the composition of demand, like
expansionary fiscal policies (see Gali [1994]). Furthermore, for the firms’ problem to have an
interior solution, we need to assume that η(z) > 1, condition which ensures that the markup is
greater than unity. Inserting solution for cN , equation (6), into (9) leads to:
µ(z) = µ
(
λ¯, p(z), gN (z)
)
, (10)
where µλ¯, µp(z) and µgN (z) are positive. An rise in λ¯ or p(z) lowers the non traded consumption
cN (z). As a consequence, the share of private consumption in total demand for non traded good
decreases, and the monopolistic firm is inclined to charge a higher markup as a greater part of
aggregate demand will not react to a relative price appreciation. An increase in gN (z) reduces
the share of consumption in total demand for non traded good z. As a result, the elasticity η(z)
falls and the equilibrium markup rises.
2.3 Firms
Domestic firms in each sector rent capital (K) and hire labor (L) to produce output (Y ) em-
ploying neoclassical production functions which feature constant returns to scale. Capital and
labor clearing conditions write as follows
KT +
∫ 1
0
KN (z)dz = K, and LT +
∫ 1
0
LN (z)dz = 1. (11)
Capital and labor can move freely between sectors and attract the same rental rates in both
sectors, ωK and ωL respectively.
2.3.1 Traded sector
Output in the traded sector, Y T is obtained according to the technology ATF
(
KT , LT
)
, where
AT , KT and LT denote productivity shift, capital and labor used in that sector respectively.
Profit maximization in the traded sector implies that the equilibrium factor prices are
ωK = A
T fk
(
kT
)
, (12a)
ωL = A
T
[
f
(
kT
)
− kT fk
(
kT
)]
, (12b)
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where the production function and marginal products are expressed in labor intensive form, i.e.
kT = KT /LT , f
(
kT
)
= F
(
KT , LT
)
/LT , and fk = ∂F/∂K
T . The constant returns to scale
hypothesis drives down profits to zero in the traded sector (ΠT = 0).
2.3.2 Non Traded sector
Similarly, in the non traded sector, each monopolistic firm produces output Y N (z) subject to
Y N (z) = ANH
(
KN (z), LN (z)
)
, where KN (z) and LN (z) represent the capital and labor used
for the production of variety z and AN is a common total factor productivity. The non traded
firm z chooses paths for KN (z) and LN (z) in order to maximize the profit
ΠN (z) = p(z)ANH
(
KN (z), LN (z)
)
− ωLL
N (z)− ωKK
N (z), (13a)
s.t. Y N (z) = cN (z) + gN (z) + I(z), and cN (z) =
(
p(z)
p
)
−ρ
cN (13b)
where the first constraint describes the non traded goods market clearing condition. The first-
order conditions for this optimization problem are
µ(z) ωK = p(z)A
Nhk
(
kN (z)
)
, (14a)
µ(z) ωL = p(z)A
N
[
h
(
kN (z)
)
− kN (z)hk
(
kN (z)
)]
, (14b)
where kN (z) = KN (z)/LN (z) denotes the capital-labor ratio for non traded firm z. Profit
maximization in that sector introduces a wedge between marginal product of each factor and
its rental rate. Making use of their market power, monopolistic firms gain profits in reducing
output and factors demands, and, the marginal products turn to be higher than rental rates. In
addition, profits are positive, ΠN (z) > 0.
2.4 Portfolio Investments
There are two assets available in the economy.6 First, foreign bonds b, denominated in terms of
traded goods, pay the exogenous world interest rate r∗. And second, non traded capital goods
are accumulated without depreciation for simplicity, according to K˙(z) = I(z), where I(z) is
the investment flow. The portfolio investor chooses paths for I(z) and K(z) to maximize the
present value of cash flows V K(z)
V K(z) =
∫
∞
t
[
ωK
p(z)
K(z)τ − I(z)τ
]
e−
∫
τ
t
rK(z)sdsdτ, (15)
subject to K˙(z) = I(z) where
∫ τ
t
rK(z)sds is the discount factor. The investor optimum is fully
characterized by:
p(z)rK(z) = ωK , (16)
where rK(z) is the rate of return on capital K(z). Portfolio investors are indifferent between
traded bonds and non traded capital assets if and only if their rates of return (expressed in the
same units) equalize. Using (14a) and (16), the no-arbitrage condition immediately follows:
r∗ =
ANhk
(
kN (z)
)
µ(z)
+
p˙(z)
p(z)
. (17)
6This section draws heavily on Bettendorf and Heijdra [2006].
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2.5 Macroeconomic Equilibrium
As is conventional in the literature, we consider the symmetric equilibrium in which all non
traded producers fix the same markup, µ(z) = µ, charge the same price, p(z) = p, implying that
kN (z) = kN for all z. The equilibrium satisfies (4a), (11) and (17) and the following equations:
µAT fk = pA
Nhk, (18a)
µAT
(
f − kT fk
)
= pAN
(
h− kNhk
)
, (18b)
K˙ = Y N − cN − gN , (18c)
b˙ = r∗b+ Y T − cT − gT . (18d)
Equations (18a) and (18b) equate the marginal physical products of capital and labor in the two
sectors. Equation (18c) is the non traded good market clearing condition. Equation (18d) which
describes the country’s current account, is obtained by combining (3), (8), (18c) and (17).7
The complete macroeconomic equilibrium can be performed by computing short-run static
solutions for sectoral capital intensities, labor demands and outputs. Static optimality conditions
(18a) and (18b) may be solved for capital intensities ratios in the form:
kT = kT (p) , and kN = kN (p) . (19)
The signs of (19) depend upon relative capital intensities, that is, kTp > 0 and k
N
p > 0 when
kT > kN .8 Substituting (19) into constraints (11) and production functions, labor demands and
outputs may be derived as follows
LT = LT (K, p) , and LN = LN (K, p) , (20a)
Y T = Y T (K, p) , and Y N = Y N (K, p) , (20b)
with LTK , Y
T
K , L
N
K , Y
N
K depending on wether k
T ≷ kN , and, LTp = −L
N
p < 0, and Y
T
p < 0,
Y Np > 0. A higher capital stock increases (decreases) labor and output in the more capital
(labor) intensive sector (Rybczynski Theorem). A rise in p shifts labor from the traded to the
non traded sector, causing the output of that sector to grow, at the detriment of Y T .
2.6 Equilibrium Dynamics
Linearizing equations (17) and (18c) around the steady-state (denoted by tilde) results in(
K˙
p˙
)
=
(
Y NK Y
N
p − c
N
p
0 −(pANhkkk
N
p )/µ
)(
K(t)− K˜
p(t)− p˜
)
. (21)
Equation (21) describes a dynamic system characterized by one negative eigenvalue, ν1, and one
positive eigenvalue, ν2, irrespectively of the sectoral capital intensities. Since the system features
one predetermined state variable, K, and one jump variable, p, the dynamics are saddle-path
7The financial wealth a equals the sum of domestic capital stock and traded bonds holding, a = b+ pK.
8As we wish to keep the model as tractable as possible, the derivatives of short-run solutions for ki, Li and
Y i, i = T,N , are evaluated in the neighborhood of an initial steady-state where gN = 0.
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stable. Starting from an initial capital stock K0, the stable solutions take the following form
K(t) = K˜ +
(
K0 − K˜
)
eν1t, (22a)
p(t) = p˜+ ω1
(
K0 − K˜
)
eν1t, (22b)
where (1, ω1) is the eigenvector associated with ν1. As is well known from two-sector models,
the qualitative equilibrium dynamics depend critically upon the relative capital intensities. In
particular, the transitional path of p(t) degenerates if kT > kN and p(t) = p˜, ∀t.9 In the
alternative situation, kN > kT , the relative price features transitional dynamics.
Linearizing (18d) around the steady state, and inserting the stable solutions for K(t) and
p(t) gives the stable solution for b(t),
b(t) = b˜+Ω (K0 − K˜)e
ν1t, (23)
consistent with the intertemporal solvency condition (b0 − b˜) = Ω (K0 − K˜). Given the initial
stocks of physical capital and foreign bonds, K0 and b0, the intertemporal budget constraint
describes the trade-off between accumulations of traded bonds and capital. Following the same
steps as before, the stable time path followed by the financial wealth a(t) is given by:
a(t) = a˜+Φ (K0 − K˜)e
ν1t. (24)
Equation (24) describes the relationship between savings and investment during the transition.
In comparison to the Turnovsky and Sen’s [1995] competitive model, the expression Ω takes
a more general form since relaxing the perfect competition assumption makes the international
bonds accumulation dependent on the variation in profits. The general form of Ω is given by
Ω = −p˜− ω1K˜ +Φ. (25)
Expression (25) highlights that three possibly offsetting effects interact on the dynamics of
internationally traded bonds along the stable adjustment. First, the negative smoothing effect,
reflected by the term −p˜, emphasizes the role of consumption smoothing on the current account.
Rather than reduce their consumption, the agents choose to finance investment by borrowing
from abroad such that the current account worsens. Second, the relative price adjustment
effect (−ω1K˜) comes from the transitional dynamics of p(t) toward the steady-state. This effect
encourages current account surpluses as the economy accumulates capital. And finally, the
savings effect, measured by Φ, can be split into two forces: the real interest rate and profit
components. The real interest rate force comes from the relative price transitional dynamics
toward the steady-state. While the capital stock accumulates, the relative price depreciates
gradually, which provides an incentive for consumers to substitute current consumption for
future consumption as the real interest rate in terms of consumption goods exceeds the world
real rate, rc > r∗ (Dornbusch [1983]). Thus, real consumption purchases fall and the savings
flow rises. The last component captures the variation in profits, caused by investment, on the
current account and is no longer obtained in a perfectly competitive model. Using standard
methods, the stable path followed by profits is Π(t) = Π˜ + Υ (K0 − K˜)e
ν1t, where Υ describes
9The expressions of ν1 , ν2 and ω1, and, of the terms Ω, Φ and Υ (see below) are documented in Appendix B.
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the relationship between profits and capital accumulation along the stable path. If Υ > 0, when
the economy accumulates capital (K0 < K˜), the profit flow is above its steady state value and,
in order to offset the reduction in future income due to the decline in profits, agents are going
to invest their high initial profit in the international market bonds.
In the case kT > kN , as dynamics for p(t) are flat (ω1 = 0), the relative price adjustment
effect and the real interest component of the savings effect become ineffective. Subsequently,
equation (25) reduces to Ω = −p˜ + Υ < 0, with Υ = Φ > 0. As Ω < 0, the smoothing
effect is large enough to compensate the profit effect, current account and investment are thus
negatively related. Moreover, Φ being positive, savings and investment flows are positively
correlated. Relaxing the perfect competition hypothesis allows to generate positive saving-
investment correlations consistent with the perfect access to financial capital markets assumption
such as Feldstein and Horioka [1980] find in their well-known empirical work.10
When kN > kT , the signs of Ω and Φ are ambiguous and point out the influence of preferences
parameters in determining the current account-investment and savings-investment relationships.
According to empirical studies which present evidence that current account is negatively linked
with investment flow (Glick and Rogoff [1995] and I˙s¸can [2000]), one may expect Ω to be
negative implying that the smoothing effect is large enough to outweigh the sum of the relative
price adjustment and the savings effects.
2.7 The Steady-State
The steady-state is reached when p˙, K˙, b˙ = 0 and is defined by the following equations:
ANhk[k
N (p˜)] = µ
(
λ¯, p˜, gN
)
r∗, (26a)
Y N (K˜, p˜)− cN (λ¯, p˜)− gN = 0, (26b)
r∗b˜+ Y T (K˜, p˜)− cT (λ¯, p˜)− gT = 0, (26c)
(b0 − b˜) = Ω (K0 − K˜). (26d)
The steady-state equilibrium jointly determine p˜, K˜, b˜ and λ¯. Equation (26a) entails that the
marginal physical product of capital in the non traded sector ties the world interest rate. From
equation (26b) it follows that the long-run investment is zero: the non traded output equals
the demand. Equation (26c) asserts that in steady-state, the current account balance must be
zero. Finally, the nation’s intertemporal budget constraint (26d) implies that the steady-state
depends on profits, that is, the existence of a monopolistic competition affects the relationship
between capital accumulation and the balance of payments.
The system (26) describing a two-sector monopolistic model cannot be solved recursively as
in the competitive case. In the latter situation, the no-arbitrage condition at the steady-state
writes as ANhk[k
N (p˜)] = r∗. The relative price is thus totally fixed by supply-side consideration,
i.e. demand shocks leave unchanged its steady-state value. This result stands in sharp contrast to
our monopolistic model which breaks down the dichotomy between supply and demand sides of
the economy. In particular, the relative price of the non traded good is affected by fiscal policies
10The treatment of physical capital assets, K, as being non traded does not involve any loss of generality in
examining the Feldstein and Horioka’s puzzle. It is worth noting that financial capital assets, b, are internationally
mobile implying that the economy features a perfect financial integration degree.
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and preferences shifts that impinge on the markup. The existence of a monopolistic competition
introduces additional features into the analysis of fiscal expansions since movements in the
relative price and the existence of profits have the potential to alter production, consumption
decisions in a manner that is absent in a competitive model.
3 Quantitative Analysis
The model is calibrated for a plausible set of utility and production parameters in order to be
consistent with data of developing countries. We assume that the instantaneous utility function
exhibits constant relative risk aversion u (c) = 1
1− 1
σ
c1−
1
σ , where σ, the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, is set equal to 0.7, value consistent with the empirical estimates (Cashin and
McDermott [2003]). Households maximize a C.E.S. aggregate consumption function given by
c
(
cT , cN
)
= (ϕ
1
φ
(
cT
)φ−1
φ +(1−ϕ)
1
φ
(
cN
)φ−1
φ )
φ
φ−1 where ϕ parameterizes the relative importance
of traded and non traded goods in the overall consumption bundle, and φ is the intratemporal
elasticity of substitution. The parameter ϕ is computed so that α ≈ 0.45 as in Stockman and
Tesar [1995]. Therefore, we assign ϕ to 0.5. The intratemporal elasticity of substitution φ
is set to 1.50 implying that the consumptions of traded and non traded are substitutes (i.e.
cTp > 0). Moreover, we complete a sensitivity analysis on φ to check the robustness of the
results to this parameter. The benchmark value for the elasticity of substitution between non
traded varieties (ρ) is chosen in order to obtain a markup value close to the empirical estimates
provided by Christopoulou and Vermeulen [2008]. We also perform a sensitivity analysis on ρ.11
The two sectors possess Cobb-Douglas intensive production functions: f
(
kT
)
=
(
kT
)θT
and
h
(
kN
)
=
(
kN
)θN
where θT and θN indicate the degrees of capital intensity in the traded and
non traded sectors respectively. When kT > kN (kN > kT ), the values of θT and θN are set
to 0.45 (0.35) and 0.35 (0.45) respectively. These values correspond roughly to sectoral capital
shares estimated by Kakkar [2003]. Following Morshed and Turnovsky [2004], productivity
parameters AT and AN are fixed to 1.5 and 1 respectively. The value of the world interest rate
is chosen to be 6% which is close to the average real rate of return to capital in the U.S. over
the period 1948-1996 estimated by King and Rebelo [1999]. The values for gT and gN are set
to obtain data consistent government expenditure-GDP ratios and to reflect the tendency for
public spending to fall disproportionately on non traded goods.
Table 3 in Appendix C reports ratios describing the benchmark steady-state. The monopolis-
tic equilibriums are reasonable characterization of a small open economy having a significant non
traded goods sector. In particular, benchmark monopolistic models predict savings-investment
correlations that are plausible with the empirical evidence: 0.75 when kT > kN and 0.20 when
kN > kT . Considering the wide range of observed correlations in OECD countries, from 0.10
to 0.97, Table 1 reports the findings of a sensitivity analysis performed for different values of ρ
along the row and different values for φ across the column12.
11Despite being a preference parameter, ρ parameterizes the degree of competition in the non traded goods
market as well. In general, it is equivalent to vary competition by altering the numbers of firms or by varying the
degree of substitution between goods (Jonsson [2007]). Modify ρ being more tractable than allow for entry/exit
of firms, the former approach is chosen to illustrate changes in the degree of competition in goods markets.
12Simulations with φ ∈ [0.3 ; 2.0] illustrate the cases φ > σ, φ = σ and φ < σ. The parameter ρ ranges different
degrees of competition from monopolistic competition (ρ = 5) to competitive non traded markets (ρ = 20).
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Table 1: Sensitivity Analysis to the Saving-Investment Correlation
Monopolistic Competition (ρ =)
PC
5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.5 9.0 9.5 10.0
φ = kT > kN
2.00 0.87 0.71 0.61 0.54 0.48 0.43 0.40 0.37 0.34 0.32 0.30 0
1.50 0.68 0.59 0.52 0.46 0.42 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.27 0
1.00 0.60 0.53 0.47 0.42 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.25 0
0.70 0.57 0.50 0.45 0.41 0.37 0.34 0.31 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.24 0
0.30 0.55 0.48 0.43 0.39 0.36 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.24 0
kN > kT
2.00 0.16 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.19
1.50 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.19
1.00 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.19
0.70 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.19
0.30 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.19
Notes: PC = Perfect Competition.
As shown in Turnovsky and Sen [1995], the savings-investment correlation in the competitive
model hinges on relative sectoral capital intensities, i.e. the correlation is zero when kT > kN and
is theoretically ambiguous in the alternative situation, kN > kT . Simulations results reveal that
in the latter case, the correlation is negative (-0.19) and insensitive to the intratemporal elasticity
of substitution. This negative correlation is contrary to the empirical evidence in Baxter and
Crucini [1993], Ubide [1999] and Obstfeld and Rogoff [2000]. In contrast, the monopolistic
competition helps the model to replicate positive savings-investment correlations found in data.
Indeed, when kN > kT , correlation coefficients remain in the positive range found in the data
for ρ < 5.5. In the situation kT > kN high savings-investment correlations are easily reproduced
under a wide variety of preferences parameters. Especially, if the market degree of competition
is weak (ρ ≤ 6.5), even small values of φ generate realistic correlations of 0.40 or more. The
main finding from Table 1 is that the monopolistic model generates realistic savings-investment
correlations for plausible parameters configurations and irrespectively of the sectoral capital
intensities. The existence of a monopolistic non traded goods sector that ensures the existence
of positive profits provides an explanation for the high empirical saving-correlations without
relaxing the assumption of strongly international mobile financial capital.
We investigate now the response of the model to demand and supply shocks. Permanent
rises in gT and gN are calibrated in order to simulate increases in the ratio g/Y of 3 points.
Technological shocks are treated as increases in AT and AN of 4% and 2% respectively.
3.1 Demand Shocks
The steady-state deviations to public demand shocks are reported in Table 4 in Appendix C. In
the model version with perfect competition and irrespective of the sectoral capital intensities,
fiscal policies induce a negative wealth effect (i.e. λ¯ increases), arising from the higher taxes
necessary to finance the higher government spending. Consequently, the private consumption is
crowded out. In the monopolistically model, this is only a partial effect. In addition, changes
in the level of government purchases appreciate the relative price of non traded good which in
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turn raises the consumer price index and magnifies the fall in consumption. Departing from
the perfect competition assumption makes the relative price of non traded good dependent of
demand shifts. Irrespective of the good on which the rise in public purchases falls, an increase
in government spending alter the composition of non traded demand in favor of its public
component since cN is reduced. As a greater part of aggregate demand does not react to
relative price changes, monopolistic firms are encouraged to set higher markup and price.
From (9) and (10), straightforward calculation shows that an increase in gN induces two
positive effects on the markup. First, it modifies directly the composition of aggregate non
traded demand by rising the share of public consumption and therefore the markup. And
second, the private consumption cN is reduced after the fiscal shock falling on gN through the
negative wealth effect, which as a consequence entails a higher markup. Comparatively, a rise
in gT improves the markup only through the wealth effect. As a result, relative price responses
to traded government expenditures shocks are smaller compared to fiscal expansions falling on
gN . In the latter case, increasing the ratio g/Y of 3 points of GDP generates relative price
appreciation of 2.6% (3.4%) when kT > kN (kN > kT ), whereas rises in gT induce soften
responses: 0.5% (0.8%) when kT > kN (kN > kT ). These numerical results are consistent with
the empirical researches which range the appreciation following an increase of three percentage
points in the share of government expenditure between 1.2% (Strauss [1999]) and 4.5%-6% for
De Gregorio et al. [1994].
The comparison of the steady-state effects on investment and current account between the
perfectly and monopolistically competitive models is particularly striking. Table 4 indicates
that for the benchmark case (φ = 1.5 and ρ = 4.5) the net effects on capital stock and net
foreign assets position may be reversed in the monopolistically competitive model compared to
those derived in the perfectly competitive framework. In particular, when kN > kT (kT > kN ),
an increase in gN (gT ) in the monopolistically competitive model involves a reduction in K˜ and
an improvement in b˜ while K˜ rises and b˜ falls in the Walrasian framework. To explore how
sensitive the comparison between the two models is to the benchmark parameter values, Table 5
in Appendix C examines the role played by the elasticities ρ and φ in determining the responses
of K and b to fiscal shocks. In the case of a rise in gN when kN > kT , the steady-state changes
in capital stock and net foreign assets position are qualitatively insensitive to variations in ρ
and φ, only the strength of responses are affected: the reduction in K˜ is moderated significantly
with declines in φ and increases in ρ for instance. In contrast, the long-run effects after a fiscal
policy falling on gT when kT > kN are highly sensitive to both parameters. However, for a
large set of values of tastes parameters, the responses of current account and investment are
qualitatively similar between the monopolistically and the perfectly competitive models.
In addition, introducing the monopolistic competition into the analysis affects substantially
the strengths of the current account and investment responses to fiscal shocks, especially those
falling on gN (when kT > kN , dK˜ = −5.1% and db˜ = 14.1% in the monopolistically competitive
model, compared to dK˜ = −0.8% and db˜ = 0.9% in the perfectly competitive one). More
precisely, the monopolistic model highlights the crucial role of intratemporal effects in deter-
mining the direction and the strength of current account and investment reactions. In response
to a relative price appreciation, intratemporal effects play through a combination of a change in
allocation of factors between the two sectors of production and a change in the distribution of
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real expense between traded and non traded consumptions. By emphasizing the influence of in-
tratemporal effects, our framework points out the importance of relative price movements as an
additional channel for transmitting fiscal policy shock to production and consumption decisions,
and, ultimately to current account and investment. Recent empirical works on the intertemporal
current account approach (see Bergin and Sheffrin [2000]) find evidence in favor of the two-good
models since allowing for real exchange rates changes improve the fit of intertemporal models
of current account.
3.2 Technological Shocks
Table 4 documents the effects on key macroeconomic variables resulting from increases in pro-
ductivity of traded and non traded sectors. In the perfectly competitive model and irrespective
of the sectoral capital intensities, a productivity growth in the traded sector, AT , is exactly
matched by a proportional one-for-one relative price appreciation. Unlike, the monopolistic
model illustrates the influence of markup as an additional channel transmitting supply shock
to the relative price since the appreciation is amplified: 4.2% when kT > kN and 4.6% when
kN > kT following a 4% increase in AT . The productivity growth in the traded sector affects
the consumption of non traded goods trough two offsetting effects: the negative price effect
and the positive wealth effect. Numerical experiments show that the price effect may offset
the wealth one, causing non traded consumption to fall in equilibrium. As a consequence, the
price elasticity declines and monopolistic firms are willing to fix higher markup which in turn
reinforces the initial relative price appreciation.
Unlike the case of a shift in AT , a technological improvement occurring in the non traded
sector translates into higher capital intensities. Under perfect competition, the relative price
depreciates and its fall is related to the capital intensities: -1.7% and -2.3% depending on wether
kT ≷ kN . Regarding the model with monopolistic competition, because the consumption of non
traded goods raises through the price and wealth effects, the markup falls unambiguously since
a greater part of non traded goods demand reacts to relative price changes. In order to maintain
the no-arbitrage condition (26a), the relative price falls by a greater amount to compensate both
the increase in AN and the reduction in µ˜: -2.1% (-3.1%) when kT > kN (kN > kT ).
Regardless the sectoral capital intensities, the economy responds to an increase in AT by
moving labor from the non traded to the traded sector, by reducing its capital stock and by accu-
mulating foreign bonds. The Table 5 displays the sensitivity of current account and investment
responses for variations in ρ and φ. These parameters, which parameterize the price elasticity
for non traded goods, may govern the extent to which the shift in productivity alters the model.
Reduce the intratemporal elasticity of substitution, φ, may change the direction of current ac-
count and investment responses compared to the benchmark scenario. When kN > kT , taking a
lower value for φ instead of 1.50 results in capital accumulation and net foreign assets position
deterioration (rather than dK˜ < 0 and db˜ > 0 in the benchmark). When kT > kN , signs of
steady-state changes in K˜ and b˜ in the monopolistic model may be reversed compared to the
corresponding perfectly framework for low values of φ.
Unlike technological shocks on AT , the responses of capital stock and foreign assets position
following a rise in AN are insensitive to sectoral capital intensities and to the intensity of
competition in the non traded goods market. Indeed, a positive shock to AN always worsens the
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current account and boosts investment. While capital stock increases exhibit similar magnitudes
in both models, the responses of the external position are more pronounced and more variable.
For example, the monopolistic model entails deterioration of the stock of foreign bonds about
11% and 4.1% when kT > kN and kN > kT respectively. These are quite significant values
considering the limited productivity growth observed in the non traded sector (2%). By contrast,
technological shocks originating from the traded sector trigger soften reactions of the foreign
assets position, suggesting that non traded productivity gains are the prime determinant of the
current account in our model. This finding is consistent with I˙s¸can’s [2000] empirical results
(Table 5, p. 604), which are drawn from a two-sector intertemporal open economy model. More
recently, Cova et al. [2008] find that TFP developments in the non traded goods sector can
broadly account for the current account patterns in the U.S., Japan, and in the euro area since
1999.
3.3 The Balassa-Samuelson Effect
The two-sector model of Turnovsky and Sen [1995] offers a suitable and tractable framework
for investigating the relative price responses to sectoral productivity growth differential, i.e. the
Balassa-Samuelson effect (Balassa [1964] and Samuelson [1964]). The core of their analyze is
identifying productivity growth differential between the traded and non traded sectors as a key
variable to determine the evolution of the long-run relative price. Assuming perfect competition,
the relative price variation induced by a productivity growth differential is computed as:
pˆ = AˆT −
(
1− θT
1− θN
)
AˆN , (27)
where a hat above a variable denotes the steady-state deviation after the shock occurred (xˆ =
(x˜− x˜0)/x˜0). From (27), it follows that the strength and the direction of the Balassa-Samuelson
effect in the competitive model depends only on factor intensities (θT and θN ). These two
parameters in turn determine the extent to which the differential in sectoral productivity growth
(AˆT − AˆN ) alters the relative price. Relaxing the perfect competition assumption makes the
Balassa-Samuelson effect dependent of markup growth rate which amplifies or dampens the
effect of technological disturbances on relative price according to
pˆ = µˆ+ AˆT −
(
1− θT
1− θN
)
AˆN . (28)
Due to price-setting behavior of non traded firms, equation (28) shows that the response of the
relative price in the monopolistic model does not correspond to the standard Balassa-Samuelson
effect. The existence of market power implies that the endogenous response of markup in the non
traded sector introduces an additional channel to understand the evolution of the relative price
after productivity shocks. Thus, if one assumes that non traded firms are perfectly competitive
when they are not, one can be led to misestimate the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Table 2 depicts
the sensitivity of the relative price response to a technological changes biased toward the traded
sector (AˆT − AˆN = 2%) to variations in parameters ρ and φ.
In the perfectly model, the relative price is entirely supply-side determined and appreciates
by 2.3% when kT > kN and 1.6% when kN > kT . In contrast, the presence of monopolistic
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Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis to the Balassa-Samuelson Effect
Monopolistic Competition (ρ =)
PC
5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.5 9.0 9.5 10.0
φ = kT > kN
2.00 2.19 2.19 2.20 2.20 2.21 2.21 2.22 2.22 2.22 2.23 2.23 2.27
1.50 2.10 2.13 2.15 2.16 2.17 2.18 2.19 2.19 2.20 2.20 2.21 2.27
1.00 2.11 2.13 2.14 2.16 2.17 2.18 2.18 2.19 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.27
0.70 2.11 2.13 2.15 2.16 2.17 2.18 2.19 2.19 2.20 2.20 2.21 2.27
0.30 2.13 2.15 2.16 2.17 2.18 2.18 2.19 2.20 2.20 2.21 2.21 2.27
kN > kT
2.00 1.40 1.43 1.45 1.46 1.48 1.49 1.49 1.50 1.51 1.51 1.52 1.59
1.50 1.34 1.38 1.41 1.43 1.44 1.46 1.47 1.48 1.49 1.49 1.50 1.59
1.00 1.32 1.36 1.38 1.41 1.42 1.44 1.45 1.46 1.47 1.48 1.48 1.59
0.70 1.32 1.35 1.38 1.40 1.42 1.43 1.44 1.45 1.46 1.47 1.48 1.59
0.30 1.31 1.35 1.37 1.39 1.41 1.42 1.44 1.45 1.46 1.46 1.47 1.59
Notes: PC = Perfect Competition.
competition and markup tends to modify the Balassa-Samuelson effect. The evidence in Table 2
shows that the competitive Balassa-Samuelson effect exceeds the one prevailing in the monopo-
listic framework. This suggests that the endogenous response of the markup softens the relative
price appreciation, i.e. the bias due to the omission of the imperfect competition is positive and
leads to overestimate the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis in a competitive framework. This bias
may be computed as (pˆpc − pˆ) /pˆ, where pˆpc corresponds to the steady-state deviation derived
inside the competitive framework, and is plotted against different values of ρ and φ in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The Balassa-Samuelson Effect Bias (in %)
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When kT > kN , the bias reaches its peak at 8% for ρ = 5 and φ = 1.30 and vanishes as
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the elasticity between non traded varieties tends to infinity. The bias is relatively insensitive
to the intratemporal substitution elasticity but much more to ρ. The monopolistic model when
kN > kT gives rise to larger bias. For ρ = 5 it attains 14%, 21% and 21% for φ = 2.00, φ = 1.00
and φ = 0.30 respectively. Interestingly, even high values of the elasticity between non traded
varieties produce significant bias (around 6% for ρ = 10 and φ = 1.50).
Our results indicate that, in estimating the Balassa-Samuelson effect, it is important to relax
the restrictive assumption of perfect competition. Not permitting for a monopolistic competition
in the non traded sector biases upward estimates of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis.
4 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper, drawing on earlier work by Turnovsky and Sen [1995], has been to
examine the implications of introducing imperfect competition in an intertemporal two-sector
small open economy model. The market structure in the non traded sector considered includes
a Dixit and Stiglitz [1977] monopolistic competition and endogenous markups which depend on
the composition of aggregate demand for non traded goods.
The quantitative simulations show that the monopolistic competition hypothesis is helpful
in reproducing key stylized facts in the international macroeconomic literature. The model
replicates reasonably the pattern of savings-investment correlations in OECD countries, without
relaxing the perfect capital mobility hypothesis. Accordingly, the model has strong implications
for the Feldstein-Horioka [1980] puzzle since it suggests a new explanation stemming from the
monopolistic competition assumption in the non traded goods sector and from the existence
of positive profits distributed to households. Moreover, introducing monopolistic competition
into the model adds new potential sources of relative price movements. Following a positive
fiscal shocks, the model features relative price appreciations, as the empirical literature found.
In addition, numerical analysis shows that the relative price responses to technological shocks
differ from the ones prevailing in the perfectly competitive model. This outcome has important
implications since assume perfect competition when it is not, biases upward estimates of the
Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. Consequently, the paper poses the need for new empirical studies
that take account of the degree of competition in the economy when assessing the link between
productivity differentials and the relative price of non traded goods. Finally, the responses
of the current account and investment to fiscal and technological shocks may be reversed in
the monopolistically competitive model compared to those derived in the perfectly competitive
framework. For the effects following fiscal policies, it has be shown that the relative price
variations provide an additional channel through which demand shocks alter the current account
and investment. Furthermore, productivity disturbances are quite dependent on the origin of
the shock and from the markets degree of competition.
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Appendix
A Short-run static solutions
By differentiating (4a) and substituting into (5), the derivatives of cT and cN write as follows:
cT
λ¯
= −σ
cT
λ¯
< 0, cTp = α
cT
p
(φ− σ) ≶ 0, (A1a)
cN
λ¯
= −σ
cN
λ¯
< 0, cNp = −
cN
p
[(1− α)φ+ ασ] < 0, (A1b)
where σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and φ is the intratemporal elasticity of
substitution. By substituting (A1b) into the definition of µ(z) yields the partial derivatives:
µλ¯ = σ
µ(z)2gN (z)
λ¯ρcN (z)
> 0, µp(z) =
µ(z)2gN (z)
p(z)cN (z)
> 0, µgN (z) =
µ(z)2
ρcN (z)
> 0. (A2)
Totally differentiating conditions (18a) and (18b) with respect to p leads to:
kTp =
ANh
µAT fkk (kN − kT )
≶ 0, kNp =
µAT f
p2ANhkk (kN − kT )
≶ 0. (A3)
Substituting (A3) into (11) and totally differentiating, one can obtain:
LTK =
1
kT − kN
≶ 0, LTp =
1
(kT − kN )
2
[
LTANh
µAT fkk
+
LNµAT f
p2ANhkk
]
< 0, (A4a)
LNK =
1
kN − kT
≶ 0, LNp = −
1
(kT − kN )
2
[
LTANh
µAT fkk
+
LNµAT f
p2ANhkk
]
> 0. (A4b)
Similarly, the traded and non traded outputs can be solved in the form:
Y TK =
AT f
kT − kN
≶ 0, Y Tp =
1
(kT − kN )
2
[
LT p
(
ANh
)2
µ2AT fkk
+
LNµ
(
AT f
)2
p2ANhkk
]
< 0, (A5a)
Y NK =
ANh
kN − kT
≶ 0, Y Np = −
1
p (kT − kN )
2
[
LN
(
µAT f
)2
p2ANhkk
+
LT p
(
ANh
)2
µAT fkk
]
> 0. (A5b)
B Dynamics and Stables Solutions
When kT > kN , the eigenvalues are given by:
ν1 = −
ANh
kT − kN
< 0, ν2 =
AT f
p (kT − kN )
> 0, (B1)
with ω1 = 0. In this case, the formal expressions for Ω, Φ and Υ are given by :
Ω = −p˜

1− ( µ˜− 1
µ˜
) r∗ − ν2(
µ˜−1
µ˜
)
r∗ − ν2



 < 0, (B2a)
Φ = Υ = p˜
(
µ˜− 1
µ˜
) r∗ − ν2(
µ˜−1
µ˜
)
r∗ − ν2

 > 0. (B2b)
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In the alternative situation, kN > kT , the eigenvalues are the following:
ν1 =
AT f
p (kT − kN )
< 0, ν2 =
ANh
kN − kT
> 0, (B3)
and ω1 = −
ν2 − ν1(
Y Np − c
N
p
) < 0. The terms Ω, Φ and Υ can be written as:
Ω = −p˜
[
1 + (µ˜− 1) +
µ˜ω1
p˜ν2
(
Yp + σc˜
N
)]
≷ 0, (B4a)
Φ = −p˜
[
(µ˜− 1) +
µ˜ω1
p˜ν2
(
Yp −
K˜ν2
µ˜
+ σc˜N
)]
≷ 0, (B4b)
Υ = −p˜
[
(µ˜− 1) +
µ˜ω1
p˜ν2
(
Yp −
Y˜ N
µ˜
)]
≷ 0, (B4c)
where Yp is the partial derivative of the national output with respect to the relative price p with
Yp = p
(
1−
1
µ
)
Y Np > 0.
C Numerical Simulations
Table 3: Steady-State Ratios
kT > kN kN > kT Data
MC PC MC PC Range Average
(a) gT /Y T 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.01 - 0.15 0.04
(b) gN/Y N 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.13 - 0.75 0.41
(c) gN/g 0.82 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.83 - 0.99 0.93
(d) g/Y 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.09 - 0.51 0.26
(e) Y N/Y 0.59 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.41 - 0.73 0.59
(f) cN/c 0.38 0.41 0.43 0.49 0.33 - 0.51 0.43
(g) µ 1.44 1.49 1.26 - 1.87 1.45
(h) corr(S, I) 0.75 0.00 0.20 -0.19 0.10 - 0.97 0.61
Notes: MC = Monopolistic Competition, PC = Perfect Competition.
Ranges and averages for rows (a)-(e) are drawn from Morshed and Turnovsky [2004]. Empir-
ical estimates for cN/c are taken from Stockman and Tesar [1995]. Markup estimates on row (g)
are provided by Christopoulou and Vermeulen [2008]. Finally, savings-investment correlations
estimates, corr(S, I), come from Ubide [1999].
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kT > kN
dk˜T dk˜N dp˜ dµ˜ dL˜T dK˜ db˜ dλ¯ dc˜ dc˜T dc˜N dpic dY˜ T dY˜ N
dgT
PC 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.49 0.61 -0.68 4.08 -2.76 -2.76 -2.76 0.00 4.49 -1.94
MC -0.91 -0.91 0.50 0.60 2.04 -0.46 1.27 5.33 -3.69 -3.42 -4.15 0.19 1.62 -2.87
dgN
PC 0.00 0.00 0.00 -6.02 -0.81 0.91 3.86 -2.61 -2.61 -2.61 0.00 -6.02 2.60
MC -4.60 -4.60 2.62 3.11 -2.22 -5.08 14.08 3.42 -2.99 -1.56 -5.32 0.98 -4.27 1.11
dAT
PC 0.00 0.00 4.00 3.63 0.49 -0.57 -3.28 1.21 3.69 -2.23 1.63 7.77 -1.57
MC -0.41 -0.41 4.24 0.27 0.94 -0.20 0.58 -4.26 1.98 4.38 -1.91 1.56 4.78 -1.32
dAN
PC 3.09 3.09 -1.66 2.73 3.47 -3.83 -0.98 1.18 0.13 2.68 -0.69 4.14 1.88
MC 3.84 3.84 -2.05 -0.47 0.68 4.00 -10.93 -1.45 1.58 0.40 3.57 -0.78 2.41 2.47
kN > kT
dk˜T dk˜N dp˜ dµ˜ dL˜T dK˜ db˜ dλ¯ dc˜ dc˜T dc˜N dpic dY˜ T dY˜ N
dgT
PC 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.81 -0.54 1.33 4.80 -3.23 -3.23 -3.23 0.00 3.81 -2.18
MC -1.22 -1.22 0.80 0.68 2.42 -1.69 1.49 4.77 -3.44 -2.94 -4.10 0.35 1.98 -2.77
dgN
PC 0.00 0.00 0.00 -4.17 0.59 -1.46 5.09 -3.42 -3.42 -3.42 0.00 -4.17 2.38
MC -4.96 -4.96 3.37 2.84 -2.38 -4.52 4.01 2.60 -2.76 -0.65 -5.46 1.44 -4.11 -0.12
dAT
PC 0.00 0.00 4.00 1.87 -0.26 0.68 -3.85 1.41 4.38 -1.58 1.94 5.95 -1.07
MC -0.88 -0.88 4.60 0.49 1.77 -1.23 1.12 -3.03 0.80 3.78 -2.99 1.96 5.51 -2.03
dAN
PC 3.67 3.67 -2.31 2.41 3.31 -7.98 -0.98 1.51 -0.24 3.33 -1.15 3.71 2.24
MC 5.02 5.02 -3.13 -0.71 1.10 4.79 -4.09 -1.38 1.97 -0.13 4.75 -1.38 2.84 3.21
T
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Monopolistic Competition (ρ =)
PC
Monopolistic Competition (ρ =)
PC
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
φ = dgT kT > kN dgN
2.00 -1.53 -0.62 -0.31 -0.15 -0.05 0.02 0.06 0.47 -10.63 -5.36 -3.79 -3.00 -2.52 -2.19 -1.96 -0.89
dK˜ 0.70 0.33 0.42 0.47 0.51 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.88 -2.53 -2.01 -1.69 -1.48 -1.32 -1.20 -1.11 -0.67
0.30 0.56 0.62 0.65 0.67 0.69 0.70 0.71 1.02 -2.14 -1.73 -1.47 -1.29 -1.16 -1.06 -0.98 -0.59
2.00 3.04 1.23 0.62 0.30 0.10 -0.03 -0.13 -0.57 21.14 10.72 7.59 6.01 5.05 4.40 3.93 1.09
db˜ 0.70 -0.66 -0.84 -0.94 -1.01 -1.07 -1.10 -1.13 -0.84 5.06 4.03 3.39 2.96 2.65 2.41 2.23 0.64
0.30 -1.12 -1.23 -1.30 -1.35 -1.38 -1.40 -1.42 -0.91 4.27 3.46 2.94 2.58 2.32 2.12 1.96 0.53
kN > kT
2.00 -1.81 -1.22 -1.00 -0.89 -0.82 -0.77 -0.73 -0.53 -5.37 -2.75 -1.81 -1.32 -1.01 -0.80 -0.65 0.60
dK˜ 0.70 -1.16 -1.00 -0.90 -0.84 -0.79 -0.76 -0.73 -0.55 -1.96 -1.38 -1.04 -0.82 -0.66 -0.54 -0.45 0.58
0.30 -1.11 -0.98 -0.89 -0.84 -0.80 -0.76 -0.74 -0.56 -1.64 -1.19 -0.91 -0.72 -0.59 -0.48 -0.40 0.57
2.00 1.68 1.63 1.71 1.84 1.98 2.13 2.28 1.31 5.04 3.67 3.10 2.73 2.46 2.24 2.04 -1.47
db˜ 0.70 1.50 1.70 1.90 2.09 2.29 2.48 2.67 1.38 2.55 2.36 2.19 2.04 1.90 1.76 1.63 -1.44
0.30 1.55 1.77 1.99 2.20 2.41 2.62 2.82 1.41 2.29 2.16 2.03 1.91 1.78 1.66 1.54 -1.43
dAT kT > kN dAN
2.00 -1.46 -0.55 -0.26 -0.12 -0.04 0.01 0.05 0.61 4.96 4.11 3.82 3.67 3.58 3.52 3.47 3.34
dK˜ 0.70 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.12 0.21 3.72 3.66 3.62 3.60 3.58 3.57 3.56 3.70
0.30 -0.14 -0.17 -0.20 -0.21 -0.23 -0.24 -0.25 0.08 3.77 3.72 3.69 3.67 3.66 3.64 3.64 3.90
2.00 2.91 1.09 0.52 0.24 0.08 -0.03 -0.10 -0.78 -9.88 -8.22 -7.65 -7.36 -7.18 -7.06 -6.97 -4.03
db˜ 0.70 0.07 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.24 -0.21 -7.44 -7.33 -7.26 -7.22 -7.18 -7.16 -7.14 -3.54
0.30 0.28 0.34 0.39 0.43 0.46 0.48 0.50 -0.07 -7.54 -7.45 -7.40 -7.36 -7.34 -7.32 -7.30 -3.41
kN > kT
2.00 -2.14 -1.29 -0.98 -0.82 -0.72 -0.66 -0.61 -0.43 5.43 4.59 4.27 4.09 3.98 3.91 3.85 3.42
dK˜ 0.70 -0.05 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07 -0.01 3.67 3.56 3.49 3.45 3.42 3.39 3.38 3.15
0.30 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.25 -0.13 3.43 3.37 3.32 3.30 3.28 3.26 3.25 3.06
1.50 2.07 1.79 1.74 1.77 1.82 1.89 1.97 1.10 -4.90 -5.94 -7.09 -8.25 -9.41 -10.56 -11.69 -8.16
db˜ 0.70 0.07 0.00 -0.06 -0.11 -0.16 -0.21 -0.26 0.01 -4.63 -5.90 -7.15 -8.38 -9.60 -10.81 -12.00 -7.69
0.30 -0.32 -0.44 -0.56 -0.67 -0.77 -0.87 -0.97 -0.34 -4.67 -5.94 -7.21 -8.46 -9.69 -10.91 -12.12 -7.54
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